Chinese Agent Impersonate as Stanford student For Intelligence Gathering
Chinese intelligence operative posing as a Stanford University student has been uncovered following an investigation into suspicious approaches made to students conducting China-related research.
The agent, using the alias “Charles Chen,” targeted several students over an extended period, primarily women researching sensitive China topics.
This revelation comes amid growing concerns about systematic Chinese Communist Party (CCP) intelligence gathering operations at elite American academic institutions, particularly those focused on advanced technologies like artificial intelligence where Stanford maintains global leadership.
A Stanford student identified only as “Anna” reported receiving increasingly suspicious messages from someone claiming to be a fellow Stanford student named Charles Chen.
What began as seemingly innocent networking requests quickly escalated into persistent and personal inquiries.
Chen asked whether Anna spoke Mandarin, sent videos of Americans who gained fame in China, and offered to pay for her travel to Beijing, even sending screenshots of bank account balances to prove he could purchase plane tickets.
The agent suggested Anna enter China for only 24 to 144 hours to avoid visa scrutiny and urged her to communicate exclusively via the Chinese version of WeChat, a platform heavily monitored by Chinese authorities.
When Chen commented on one of Anna’s social media posts asking her to delete screenshots of their conversations, she contacted authorities.
CCP’s Broader Intelligence Networks at Stanford
The investigation revealed that “Charles Chen” had no actual Stanford affiliation but had been impersonating a student for years, slightly altering his name and online persona while targeting multiple students.
Experts assisting in the investigation identified him as likely an agent of China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS).
This case represents just one facet of what experts describe as a “crowdsourced approach” to information gathering at Stanford.
Dubbed “non-traditional collection,” this strategy employs civilians unaffiliated with intelligence agencies to gather sensitive information, particularly in AI and robotics research.
According to anonymous sources, among Stanford’s approximately 1,129 Chinese international students, a select number actively report to the CCP, as mandated by China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law.
Scholarships and Surveillance
The Chinese Scholarship Council (CSC), which funds an estimated 15% of Chinese students at American universities, serves as a primary channel for information gathering.
Students receiving these scholarships must regularly submit “Situation Reports” to Chinese diplomatic missions about their research activities.
Matthew Turpin, former U.S. National Security Council’s Director for China, stated: “The Chinese government spends a lot of time collecting data on its overseas students…
If students have access to things the government would like access to, it is relatively easy to reach out to an individual.
They use carrots and sticks”. In some cases, Chinese nationals with family members in China face coercion, with relatives “brought in for a talk with the police” to encourage compliance with information requests.
This investigation underscores growing concerns about Chinese intelligence activities at American universities, highlighting the need for increased awareness while ensuring legitimate Chinese scholars aren’t unfairly scrutinized.