Zero-Trust Policy Bypass Enables Exploitation of Vulnerabilities and Manipulation of NHI Secrets

A new project has exposed a critical attack vector that exploits protocol vulnerabilities to disrupt DNS infrastructure, manipulate Non-Human Identity (NHI) secrets, and ultimately bypass zero-trust security frameworks.

This research, conducted in a controlled lab environment, highlights a sophisticated attack chain targeting BIND DNS servers using a known vulnerability, CVE-2025-40775, rated as High severity with a CVSS score of 7.5.

By crafting a malformed TSIG DNS packet with an invalid algorithm field, attackers can trigger an assertion failure in BIND versions 9.20.0–9.20.8, crashing the server and disrupting DNS resolution for dependent cloud services.

This denial-of-service (DoS) attack, executed using tools like Scapy, sets the stage for deeper exploitation by interfering with critical security workflows in modern cloud-native environments.

Uncovering Protocol Weaknesses

The cascading impact of this DNS outage reveals a troubling gap in NHI lifecycle management, where secret rotation mechanisms fail under infrastructure stress.

When communication with secrets managers like HashiCorp Vault is severed due to DNS unavailability, systems often fall back to static or break-glass credentials as a contingency measure.

This project simulates such a failure using a Python-based client, demonstrating how NHIs such as API keys or machine identities can be exposed or relied upon in plaintext during retry attempts.

Disrupting Secret Rotation

The final phase of the attack involves leveraging these static credentials to bypass zero-trust policies, which typically depend on continuous authentication and ephemeral secrets.

By forging authentication tokens or directly using compromised keys, attackers can impersonate trusted services and gain unauthorized access to protected APIs, effectively undermining the fundamental principles of zero-trust architecture.

According to the Report, this end-to-end exploit chain, meticulously documented with real screenshots and reproducible scripts, serves as a stark reminder of the fragility of protocol-layer defenses in interconnected systems.

The research environment, orchestrated via Docker Compose, replicates a realistic cloud scenario where a vulnerable BIND 9.20.8 instance is crashed, NHI rotation fails, and a static credential is exploited to access restricted resources.

The implications are profound, as even robust security frameworks can be invalidated by foundational weaknesses in DNS infrastructure and improper handling of fallback mechanisms during failures.

While the demonstration avoids AI/ML dependencies to focus on protocol-level flaws, it underscores the urgent need for organizations to eliminate static credentials, harden DNS services against anomalies, and design secrets management systems that degrade securely under duress.

As a responsible disclosure, this project emphasizes that all testing was confined to a lab setting for educational purposes, urging immediate patching to BIND 9.20.9 or later to mitigate the DoS risk posed by CVE-2025-40775.

This vulnerability, linked to CWE-232 (Improper Handling of Undefined Values), exemplifies how seemingly minor protocol oversights can cascade into systemic breaches, challenging the integrity of zero-trust models in today’s digital landscape.